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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been a well-settled principle in American labor law that an employer faced
with an economic strike by its employees' may hire permanent replacement workers
to carry on its business. 2 In Belknap, Inc. v. Hale3 the United States Supreme Court
held that replacement workers hired to fill the positions of economic strikers4 may
bring breach of contract and misrepresentation actions in state court, if the replace-
ments were promised permanent employment but then ultimately were discharged as
a result of a settlement agreement between the employer and the strikers that called
for reinstatement of the striking employees. 5 In so holding, the Belknap Court
overlooked the adverse effects the decision will have on the American labor policy of
promoting peaceful settlement of labor disputes. This Comment examines how
Belknap (1) casts further confusion on the vitality of a coherent body of preemption
case law and (2) upsets the congressionally determined balance of power between
employees and employers. In addition, this Comment proposes a solution to the
problems created by Belknap.
II. The PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal legisla-
tion supersedes state law. The Supremacy Clause provides that "the Laws of the
United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding. ' ' 6 In 1935 Congress passed the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), 7 which provides a comprehensive federal scheme governing labor-man-
agement relations. In 1937 the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the NLRA in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.8 The Jones & Laughlin
Court recognized that the purpose of the NLRA is to promote collective bargaining
between employers and employee-chosen representatives, so that through collective
negotiation private agreements ordering industrial relations can be established,
I. An economic strike is one that is neither caused nor prolonged by an unfair labor practice on the part of the
employer. 2 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1007 (2d ed. 1983).
2. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); accord NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389
U.S. 375 (1967); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
3. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
4. Employees who engage in a work stoppage for reasons other than to protest an employer's commission of an
unfair labor practice are considered economic strikers. R. GORmAN, BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION. AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 339 (1976).
5. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 103 S. Ct. 3172, 3182 (1983).
6. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, el. 2.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
8. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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thereby minimizing industrial strife.9 Later, in 1945 the Court held in Hill v. Floridat
that states can not enact regulations which burden the exercise of rights guaranteed to
employees by the NLRA. I I As a result, federal law preempts state law that conflicts
with the federal labor legislation.
While inconsistent state labor laws must yield to the federal comprehensive
scheme evidenced by the NLRA, state and federal courts have varied in their
interpretation of which state laws are inconsistent with the NLRA.12 Courts have
disagreed on when state law can operate in connection with a labor-management
controversy. As a result, the Supreme Court has gradually developed a "preemption
doctrine." The doctrine has had a chaotic history and has caused much confusion.
Despite the morass of case law, however, there has been some consistency in the
Court's preemption decisions.
The United States Supreme Court applies two different theories under the
preemption doctrine. The first theory has been labeled the primary jurisdiction
rationale.' 3 The Court relies on the primary jurisdiction rationale in preemption
decisions that involve an actual or potential conflict between state tribunals and the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the agency given authority to enforce and
administer provisions in the NLRA.14 The second theory is the substantive rights
rationale.15 This theory is used in cases when state and federal substantive law either
actually or potentially conflict. Although the Court continues to recognize each
rationale as a distinct theory,' 6 in many cases it has applied the two rationales to
supplement each other. The Court's overlapping discussion of both theories by the
Court is probably responsible for the existence of the many questions concerning the
9. Id. at 45; see also Local 24, Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959).
10. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
11. Id. at 543.
12. See Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), in which the Court recognized that federal
labor law "'leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much." Id. at 488. The Court
recognized again that "Congress withdrew from the States much that had theretofore rested with them" in enacting the
NLRA, and "what has been taken from the States and what has been left to them are of a Delphic nature, to be translated
into concreteness by the process of litigating elucidation." International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617.
619 (1958).
13. The Court referred to this preemption rationale as the "primary jurisdiction of the NLRB" in San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). The label "primary jurisdiction" appears to have been adopted
in Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUtM. L. REv. 469, 472 (1972). The
coined phrase has gained widespread acceptance and use by courts and commentators.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
15. The phrase "substantive rights" comes from A. Cox, D. BoK & R. GORMtAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ONLABOR
LAw 917 (9th ed. 1981). In R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 768, this theory is referred to as the "substantive" rationale.
This second area of preemption has also been referred to as laissez-faire preemption, when conduct which Congress
intended to be free from governmental control is involved. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council
of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 219 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Brody, Labor Preemption Again-After
the Searing of Garmon, 13 Sw. U.L. Rev. 201, 205 (1982); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv.
1337, 1352 (1972). The phrase negative inference has also been used to describe this area of preemption. when the conduct
is to be free from governmental control. See Lesnick, supra note 13, at 478. For the purpose of this Comment the
substantive rights rationale is used to describe the second area of preemption, to clarify its emphasis on the conflict between
state and federal law. The substantive rights rationale includes the laissez-faire area-conduct that is to remain free from
any regulation. This is distinct from the primary jurisdiction rationale's emphasis on the conflict between state and federal
tribunals and procedures; the two rationales, however, overlap considerably.
16. See, e.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983); New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor,
440 U.S. 519, 528 n. 12 (1979); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180
(1978); Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
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preemption doctrine. The doctrine becomes easier to understand, however, when the
different situations in which the preemption doctrine may be applied are examined.
A court will be confronted with one of three possible situations when the
controversy before it presents the preemption issue. First, state law may regulate, in
parallel with federal law, conduct governed by the NLRA. Although there may be no
conflict between the substantive state and federal laws, the danger of a conflict
between the state and federal regulatory bodies is still present. In this case, a pristine
application of the primary jurisdiction rationale is appropriate.
Second, state law regulating certain conduct may in some degree conflict with
federal substantive law set forth in the NLRA. Alternatively, the state law may
conflict with federal labor policy. In this case, an examination of both the primary
jurisdiction rationale and the substantive rights rationale is needed. The amount of
discussion and weight to be given each rationale depends on the degree to which the
substantive laws are in conflict. If the state law and the NLRA directly conflict, the
substantive rationale should be considered more fully. If the conflict stems from the
effect of a state law on federal labor law or federal labor policy and the real danger
is the conflicting procedures of the NLRB and the state tribunal, the primary
jurisdiction rationale should be given more consideration.
The third situation is when state law attempts to regulate conduct which is neither
expressly protected nor prohibited by the NLRA, but the conduct is the type of
activity which Congress intended to be unregulated by any authority and left to the
free play of economic forces. 17 In this situation the state law is subject to preemption
under the substantive rights rationale. It is possible, however, that the primary
jurisdiction rationale should also be applied since a state tribunal that attempts to
apply state law to conduct which was meant to be unregulated conflicts with the
NLRB, which takes "action" by its inaction. Thus, a danger in this case arises from
conflicting procedures of state and federal agencies.
Preemption cases inevitably fit into one of the above categories and should be
treated accordingly. The history and trend of the preemption doctrine and its
rationales are examined below.
A. The Primary Jurisdiction Rationale
Prior to 1959 the Supreme Court had not pronounced any dogmatic preemption
rules. As a result, courts formulated a variety of preemption analyses, providing little,
if any, predictability in the results of preemption cases. For example, some courts
applied general common law, as opposed to state rules specifically designed to
regulate labor relations.' 8 Other courts attempted to scrutinize the NLRA to determine
whether state courts had, in fact, arrived at conclusions inconsistent with the NLRA,19
and often allowed states to provide remedies supplemental to the relief granted by the
17. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140
(1976); NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971).
18. See, e.g., UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
19. See, e.g., UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
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NLRA. 20 The courts espoused various rationales for finding or not finding a state law
preempted in each case in which the issue was presented. By approaching the
application of preemption on an ad hoc basis, important federal interests in the
uniformity of federal labor law and the use of a centrally administered expert agency
to apply the federal law were sacrificed, and a doctrine which would produce
predictability in results and which could easily be applied by the lower courts was not
formulated. 2'
Finally, in 1959 the United State Supreme Court formulated in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon22 a broad rule to be used in labor preemption
cases. If the regulated activities are actually or arguably protected by section 7 of the
NLRA, 23 or are actually or arguably prohibited by section 8 of the NLRA,24 a state
or federal court must decline to assert jurisdiction over the controversy; the cause must
be left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.25 However, the Court declared two
exceptions to this general rule. 26 Justice Harlan concurred in the result reached in
Garmon, but found it necessary to emphasize that the question in preemption cases
is whether the conduct is federally protected or prohibited. 27 He believed that the
states could regulate conduct which is neither protected nor prohibited by the NLRA.
Justice Harlan was particularly concerned that states would be unable to furnish an
effective remedy for redressing nonviolent tortious conduct.28
The Garmon Court recognized that in enacting the NLRA, Congress had
entrusted the administration of the Act to a centralized administrative agency, the
NLRB, which is equipped with specialized knowledge and cumulative experience in
the field of labor-management relations. 29 In addition, the NLRB has its own
procedures to deal with labor problems. The paramount consideration in determining
whether state law should be preempted is the danger, actual or potential, of conflict
20. See, e.g., Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
21. See Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec., Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 288-91
(1971).
22. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
23. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), provides that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
24. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982), defines employer unfair labor practices. The
most basic provision states that "Jilt shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." Id. § 158(a)(1).
National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982), defines conduct which constitutes unfair labor
practices committed by labor organizations.
25. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 87-91.
27. 359 U.S. 236, 250 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 253. The decision in Garmon was reached before the NLRA was amended in 1959 by § 14(c), now
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1982), which permits state courts to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes in which
the Board declines to assert its jurisdiction. The Court previously had held that if the NLRB declined to exercise its
jurisdiction, the states were not free to regulate activities they would otherwise be precluded from regulating. See Guss
v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 9 (1957).
29. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1959) (citing Garner v. Teamsters Local
Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953)).
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with the national labor policy and its goals of the uniform application of federal labor
law, the peaceful settlement of labor disputes, and the encouragement of collective
bargaining. 30
While problems arose in the application of Garmon to certain types of cases
involving state law, 3' the primary jurisdiction doctrine was widely accepted by the
courts, and its vitality was reestablished in Amalgamated Association of Street,
Electric, Railway & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge.32 In holding that a state
breach of contract action brought by an employee against the employee's union was
preempted by the NLRA, the Court took the opportunity to expound on the policies
underlying the NLRA and the necessity of maintaining the primary jurisdiction
rationale in preemption cases. The Court confirmed that the principles of preemption
are designed to avoid conflicting regulation by various official bodies which might
have some authority over the subject matter. 33 Congress conferred on the NLRB the
responsibility for applying and developing the federal labor laws. Granting concurrent
state and federal jurisdiction defeats the goals of the NLRA in its effort to achieve a
uniform national labor policy. 34 The Court emphasized, as it had indicated in
Garmon, that the proper focus in preemption cases is on the conduct being regulated,
not on the formal description of governing legal standards.3 5
The Lockridge Court noted the federal system's mandate that the preemption
issue be governed by a rule capable of easy application in the lower courts. The Court
rejected a case-by-case method of determining whether a state law conflicts in some
manner with federal labor policy. 36 The primary jurisdiction rationale provides the
courts with an easy to apply rule that achieves predictability of results. Thus, the rule
promotes the development of a uniform national labor policy, a goal deemed essential
by the NLRA.
Justice Douglas, Justice White, and Chief Justice Burger dissented from the
majority opinion in Lockridge. While the dissenters agreed with the application of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine in preemption cases, they did not believe that preemp-
tion should be applied to cases involving union-employee controversies. Justice
Douglas felt that the NLRA does not undertake the regulation of disputes between an
employee and his or her union, at least when the dispute does not relate to the
employee's job. Therefore, Justice Douglas believed that state action is appropriate
in cases presenting a union-employee controversy. 37
Justice White, with whom Chief Justice Burger joined in a separate dissenting
opinion, was concerned with the arguably protected branch of the Garmon doctrine.
Justice White recognized that an employer faced with arguably protected union
conduct can not secure an NLRB determination on the question of whether the union
30. Id. at 242.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 87-91.
32. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
33. Id. at 284-86.
34. Id. at 286-88 passin.
35. Id. at 292.
36. Id. at 294.
37. Id. at 308 (Douglas, J., dissenting); cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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activity is actually protected by the NLRA; any state action against a union engaged
in arguably protected conduct is preempted and no decision can be reached on whether
the conduct is actually protected by the NLRA. The employer can obtain a decision
only if an independent NLRA unfair labor practice is committed and a charge is filed
with the Board. When an employer's state action alleging that union conduct violates
state law is preempted, an employer faced with arguably protected conduct is without
a forum to determine whether the arguably protected conduct is actually protected by
the NLRA. Preempted actions in which arguably protected conduct is not actually
protected present valid claims which are left remediless. Thus, White urged the
rejection of the arguably protected branch of the primary jurisdiction rationale. 38
Lockridge approved the existence of the Garmon primary jurisdiction rationale.
However, the Lockridge Court also underscored the exceptions to the rationale.
Following Lockridge, courts that wanted to find state laws not preempted by the
NLRA could fit the laws into the Garmon exceptions. This began to threaten the
primary jurisdiction rationale. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District
of Carpenters39 the Court again established the rationale's validity, but narrowed its
application.
In Sears the Court cited and applied Garmon with approval. However, the Sears
decision significantly expanded the exceptions to the Garmon rule, thereby narrowing
the scope of the primary jurisdiction rationale. The union in Sears complained that the
employer, in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the employer
and the union, had hired nonunion employees to work on a construction site. The
union established a picket line on Sears' property to protest the alleged violation of
the agreement. Sears commenced a state court trespass action against the union and
sought to enjoin the picketing. 40
The Sears majority stated that the union activity was both arguably protected and
arguably prohibited by the NLRA. 41 Under the arguably prohibited branch of
Garmon, however, the Sears majority reasoned that preemption was unnecessary
since the controversy presented to the state court was not identical to the controversy
which could have been presented to the NLRB.42 The Court held that the critical
inquiry in arguably prohibited cases is whether the state court controversy is identical
to the controversy which could be presented to the NLRB; if the two cases are not
identical, the state action is not preempted by the arguably prohibited branch of
Garmon.43 Writing for the Sears majority, Justice Stevens argued that since in Sears
38. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec., Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 309-19 (White,
J., dissenting). White had expressed this view earlier in Longshoremen v. Ariadne Co.. 397 U.S. 195 (1970). and would
have held in Ariadne that when "employers are effectively denied determinations by the NLRB as to whether 'arguably
protected' picketing is actually protected ...only labor activity determined to be actually, rather than arguably.
protected under federal law should be immune from state judicial control." Id. at 202 (White, J., concurring). Similarly.
in Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970), Chief Justice Burger expressed concern for the "hiatus" created
in arguably protected cases when the NLRB does not assert jurisdiction and the state court action is preempted. Id. at 227
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
39. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
40. Id. at 182-83.
41. Id. at 187.
42. Id. at 198.
43. Id. at 197.
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the NLRB would have inquired into the nature of the picketing, while in the trespass
action the state court inquired into the location of the picketing, the controversies
were not identical, and therefore the state court action did not need to be preempted.
44
Stevens also reasoned that the arguably protected branch of Garmon did not
preempt the trespass action. He adopted the argument raised by Justice White in his
Lockridge dissent45 and indicated that only through the union's filing of an inde-
pendent unfair labor practice could the controversy have been brought before the
NLRB. 46 A party like Sears, faced with arguably protected conduct, would have no
independent access to a Board determination on whether the conduct was actually
protected; a state court action which governs arguably protected conduct was to be
preempted, and the party faced with arguably protected conduct had no complaint
under the NLRA to file with the Board. Justice Stevens thought the denial of NLRB
review justified a finding that the state trespass action should not be preempted.
Justice Brennan wrote a vigorous dissent in Sears. He believed that the majority
opinion undermined the primary jurisdiction rationale. Application of the Sears
modified rule would be applied inconsistently by lower courts and would disserve the
interests protected by the NLRA. 47 Brennan argued that the altered Garmon formu-
lation would allow state court judgments to interfere with the interests of employers,
employees, and the public, interests that are of central concern to national labor
policy. He emphasized that preemption is necessary to promote uniformity in the
application of national labor policy, and that the Board, drawing on its expertise in
labor matters, is the appropriate agency to assess the strength of section 7 rights and
section 8 violations.48
As a result of the Garmon-Lockridge-Sears trilogy, the primary jurisdiction
rationale remains applicable in preemption cases. Courts generally agree that state
laws which purport to regulate activities actually protected by section 7 of the NLRA
or actually prohibited by section 8 of the NLRA must be preempted. Courts also do
not dispute that state laws which regulate activites not protected and not prohibited by
the NLRA, and not intended to be left unregulated, are not to be preempted. The
problems in applying the primary jurisdiction rationale in preemption cases involve
state laws which regulate activities arguably protected or arguably prohibited by the
NLRA. While Garnon and Lockridge require preemption of state laws when the
initial inquiry reveals that the conduct is arguably protected or arguably prohibited by
the NLRA, Sears altered this approach. The Sears Court observed problems with the
"arguably" branches of Garmon, and the Court appears to be striving to give state
courts increased power in labor-management controversies.
44. Id. at 198.
45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
46. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 201-03 (1978). The
Sears Court ignored that the conduct involved was also arguably prohibited, and the employer could have sought NLRB
jurisdiction by filing an unfair labor practice complaint. The Court must have been concerned with cases in which the
conduct was only arguably protected and must have been anxious to modify the arguably protected test.
47. Id. at 224 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 235.
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The Sears Court correctly recognized that some activities, while arguably
protected, are not actually protected by the NLRA. Thus, some parties who could
otherwise maintain valid state actions against wrongdoers will be left without redress
because their actions involving arguably protected activity are preempted. A com-
plaining party will be ousted from state court under Garmon if the defendant claims
his or her actions are arguably protected by the NLRA. In addition, the complainant
cannot gain access to NLRB jurisdiction to determine whether the activity is in fact
actually protected, unless the complaining party can also file, for independent
reasons, an unfair labor practice charge against the party who alleges its conduct is
arguably protected by the NLRA. This leaves the complainant without a forum to
have the dispute settled. 49 This is a valid concern, but in weighing the importance of
a uniform federal labor policy against the possibility that some parties will be denied
relief even though they might possess valid state claims, the rights of the individual
must yield. 50 An easily applicable preemption doctrine must be fashioned to ensure
that states defer to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB in matters involving the
delicate balance of employee, employer, and community interests. Some individual
claims must be without redress in order to maintain an easy to apply preemption rule
that produces predictable outcomes and results in a uniform national labor policy. 5t
Sears also limited the arguably prohibited branch of Garmon. Problems arise
when a state action is brought against a defendant who asserts as an affirmative
defense that the conduct is arguably prohibited by the NLRA, and that the state action
must therefore yield to federal law. The defendant then is defending a state claim on
the ground that he or she violated federal law. 52 Arguably, this presents an insidious
situation. However, a party with a claim against an alleged wrongdoer who engaged
in arguably prohibited conduct could file a complaint with the NLRB. If the NLRB
declined to exercise its jurisdiction, the complaining party in many cases could then
take the action to state court as provided by section 14(c) of the NLRA. 53 Regardless
of the propriety of the state action, the complainant received an NLRB determination.
Under Sears, if an activity is arguably prohibited by the NLRA a state law
regulating the activity will not be preempted by the arguably prohibited branch of
Garmon if the controversy presented to the state court is different from the contro-
49. See supra note 38.
50. See Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of
Garmon, 56 VA. L. REV. 1435 (1970), in which the author recognizes that the "arguably protected" test leaves employers'
interests in an unsatisfactory condition and results in a "no man's land" where adjudication of whether the activity is
actually protected is forbidden. Come asserts, however, that modification of the arguably protected branch of Garmon
would substantially impair the objective of a uniform national labor policy. Id. at 1452; see also Taggart v. \Veinacker's,
Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 230 (1970) (Harlan, J., mem. op.), in which Harlan argues that even if wrongs may occasionally go
unredressed, regulation of arguably protected conduct must be preempted to ensure uniformity in federal labor law; Brody,
supra note 15; cf. Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277, 288-91 (1980).
51. Cox, supra note 50, at 291.
52. See Brody, supra note 15, at 207 (author asserts that this defense "violates basic notions ofjustice and common
sense"); Lesnick, supra note 13, at 474 (absurd if union-defendant's defense is that it violated federal law and the
employer-plaintiff rebuts this by asserting that the union's conduct was proper under federal law). But see it re Sewell,
690 F.2d 403, 409 (4th Cir. 1982) (defense that conduct is actually prohibited by the NLRA justified preemption).
53. See supra note 28. However, there are exceptions to § 14(c) and the Court had held that some cases are not
subject to state jurisdiction even when the NLRB declines to assert its own jurisdiction.
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versy that could be presented to the NLRB. 5 4 The Court thus developed a new
"critical inquiry" test for arguably prohibited conduct. The Sears majority, in an
attempt to preserve state jurisdiction over the controversy, strained the interpretation
of the activity being regulated. The conduct in Sears was union picketing. This
activity was arguably prohibited by the NLRA since the picketing might have been
in violation of the union-employer collective bargaining agreement. Under Garmon
and Lockridge, therefore, the state trespass laws that attempted to regulate the
picketing should have been preempted. The Sears Court, however, distinguished the
conduct being regulated by the state, the location of the picketing, from the nature of
the activity.5 5 In so doing, the Court implicitly defined the conduct by the legal
standard of trespassing, thereby ignoring the mandate of Garmon and Lockridge that
the proper focus in preemption cases is on the conduct being regulated, not on a
description of the legal standards.5 6 By departing from a focus on conduct itself, it is
difficult to imagine a case in which a court could not distinguish an action brought
before a state tribunal from an action brought before the NLRB. States are now free
to contort a state action into one which may be found not preempted by the NLRA.
Allowing states to exercise greater power over labor disputes sacrifices uniformity in
national labor policy and severely lessens the predictability of results in cases which
present the preemption issue.
It remains unclear how the state courts will react to and apply the "arguably"
standards formulated in Sears. As evidence of confusion that might develop, the
Ninth Circuit recently applied the rationale of the arguably prohibited critical inquiry
test-that if the controversy before the Board and the courts could not fairly be called
identical, preemption should not follow-to conduct which was arguably protected by
the NLRA. 57 In addition, the Supreme Court has recently added to the morass of
preemption decisions by apparently changing the focus of its inquiry in preemption
cases.
In Local 926, International Union of Operating Engineers v. Jones58 the Court
recognized the distinction it formulated in Sears, but emphasized that the proper focus
of concern in preemption cases is on the conduct being regulated. The Jones Court
held that an action brought by a low level supervisor against his or her union for
tortious interference with contract and conspiracy is preempted by federal law even
though the contract claim could be distinguished from a complaint brought before the
NLRB. 59 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the three dissenters in Jones, accused the
Jones majority of overlooking the Sears-modified Garnon rule in cases involving
arguably prohibited conduct. He believed that the state action was different from the
action that could have been brought before the NLRB, since proof of coercion was
54. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 197 (1978).
55. Id. at 198.
56. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec., Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 292 (1971);
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 250 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring).
57. Waggoner v. McGray. 607 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1979); see also United Credit Bureau of Am., Inc. v. NLRB,
643 F.2d 1017, 1025 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 994 (1981).
58. 460 U.S. 669 (1983).
59. Id. at 684.
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not required in the state action. 60 He believed that the Jones majority had not applied
Sears, and emphasized that preemption is not dictated merely because a state claim
is based on arguably prohibited conduct.6 1 Jones further confuses the preemption
doctrine. The Court needs to formulate a rule which is easier to apply and which
yields greater predictability in the outcome of litigation.
B. Substantive Rights Rationale
In addition to the primary jurisdiction rationale, the Court applies a second
theory in support of the preemption doctrine-the substantive rights rationale. In
United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (Briggs-
Stratton)62 the Court held that an activity neither protected nor prohibited by the
NLRA can be governed by state law. 63 However, the Court soon realized that
Congress intended to leave some activities entirely unregulated by any federal or state
authority. 64 Although the NLRA's purpose is to promote collective bargaining and
reduce industrial strife, the federal labor law scheme also recognizes that economic
pressure is a vital part of the bargaining process. Thus, economic weapons should be
available to both employers and employees if peaceful negotiations fail.
The Court recognized that allowing a state to regulate conduct which Congress
intended to leave completely unregulated would obstruct federal labor policy to the
same extent as allowing a state to regulate conduct expressly protected by the
NLRA.65
The Court stated in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union66 that the
overall goal of the NLRA is the achievement of industrial peace. To foster this
objective, Congress imposed a duty on both the employer and the union to confer in
good faith with a desire to reach an agreement. However, "[tihe presence of
economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is
part and parcel of the system that the [NLRA has] recognized." 67 The majority in
Insurance Agents' argued that if economic weapons were regulated, the regulating
authority would be in a position to exercise great influence over the substantive terms
of an agreement between the parties.68 By affecting an economic weapon which
Congress made available to a party involved in negotiations, a tribunal affects the
bargaining leverage of the party who could otherwise exercise its economic clout.
This situation, in turn, affects the terms of the ensuing agreement, since a party who
can not threaten economic action will be forced to bargain with less vigor. To allow
60. Id. at 690 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 685-86 n.2.
62. 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
63. Id.
64. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140
(1976); NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971); see also Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Eng'rs Beneficial
Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181, 189 (1965); Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259 (1964); San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 240 (1959).
65. Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 499-500 (1953).
66. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
67. Id. at 489.
68. Id. at 490.
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governmental interference with the substantive terms of a collective agreement
violates federal labor policy. 69 Thus, neither state nor federal authorities should
regulate economic weapons granted to combatants in a labor dispute.
While some conduct was to be left unregulated, the Court had to determine
which activities Congress intended to be free from control. The standard used is
whether Congress has occupied the field (by its silence in the NLRA) and thereby has
closed it to state regulation. The answer depends upon whether the application of state
law would frustrate the purpose of the federal legislation. 70
In Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton7' the Court held that a secondary boycott72 is
a form of self-help available to unions to help them achieve their bargaining goals
during negotiations; although the NLRA neither prohibits nor protects secondary
boycotts, state attempts to regulate them must be preempted. The boycott's use was
part of the balance struck by Congress between the conflicting interests of the union,
the employees, the employer, and the community. 73
In American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB 74 the Court held that resort to economic
weapons is a right of employers as well as employees, and that an employer is
permitted to use a temporary layoff as an economic weapon in support of its
bargaining position. 75 Employers, to counterbalance the employees' power to strike,
have the right to hire permanent replacements to carry on the employer's business. 76
The Court examined its past preemption decisions that involved conduct which
Congress intended to be free from regulation and formulated, in Lodge 76, Interna-
tional Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,77
a preemption rule for conduct that is to be left entirely free for the operation of
economic forces. The Machinists Court reaffirmed its position that an activity might
be protected by federal law not only when it is expressly mentioned in section 7, but
also when congressional silence indicates that the activity is to be unrestricted by any
governmental power, federal or state.78 One commentator suggests that this type of
conduct be called "permitted activity." '79 Through the regulation of permitted
activities that can be used as part of the collective bargaining process, states can exert
considerable influence on the substantive terms of the parties' agreement. 80 This
result is contrary to federal policy, which mandates that substantive terms of labor
agreements be free from governmental intervention. The Machinists Court expressly
69. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949)).
70. Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258 (1964); see also Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380 (1969).
71. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
72. A secondary boycott occurs when a union applies economic pressure to a person, with whom the union does
not have a dispute regarding its own terms of employment, in order to induce that person to cease doing business with
another employer with whom the union does have a dispute. R. GORMIAN, supra note 4, at 240.
73. Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259 (1964).
74. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
75. Id. at 317.
76. Id. at 325.
77. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
78. Id. at 141.
79. Cox, supra note 15, at 1346.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
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overruled Briggs-Stratton, which had taken a contrary approach. 81 Therefore, state
attempts to regulate conduct intended by Congress to be left unregulated by any
authority must be federally preempted. Permitted activities are to be free from state
regulation, and state law purporting to regulate permitted activities must be pre-
empted.
In New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor 2 a plurality
of the Court held that national labor policy does not prohibit the payment of state
unemployment compensation to striking employees. 83 The three concurring justices
joined the three dissenting justices and argued that in determining whether a state
should be allowed to regulate conduct which is unmentioned in the NLRA, an intent
to preempt state law should be presumed if the state law affects the balance of power
between labor and management, unless it fits into one of two possible exceptions.
Exceptions should be made for conduct either evidencing a merely peripheral concern
of the NLRA or involving deeply rooted local feelings.8 4 This presumption, however,
was not adopted by the majority opinion, even though six of the nine Justices were
in agreement. It has been suggested that state laws of "general applicability" 85 be
allowed to operate, unless the operation of state law interferes with a specific federal
right,86 since it is unlikely that these general state laws will upset the balance of
interests set up by Congress in the NLRA.
C. Exceptions to the Preemption Doctrine
The Garmon Court recognized two exceptions to the primary jurisdiction
rationale. The first exception is when the activity regulated is a peripheral concern of
the NLRA. The second exception is for regulated conduct which touches interests "so
deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that in the absence of compelling
Congressional direction" one could not infer that Congress has deprived the state of
power to act. In these two instances state power to regulate the activity is not to be
withdrawn.8 7
The Court has held violent activities or activities that imminently threaten
violence to be permissible targets of state regulation. 88 Malicious defamation actions
arising from conduct in labor disputes have been held to fall within the exceptions to
preemption and thus, not preempted by federal law. 89 The Court has also held that
81. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 154 (1976).
82. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
83. Id. at 527.
84. Id. at 549 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 566 (Powell, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes
87-91 for a discussion of the preemption exceptions.
85. Cox, supra note 15, at 1355-56; see also Cox, supra note 50; Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations,
67 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1954).
86. Cox, supra note 15, at 1356.
87. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959).
88. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); United Constr.
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
89. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (The Court applied the standard it had
formulated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and held that malice and actual damages must be
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state actions brought by union members against their union for intentional infliction
of emotional distress are not preempted by the NLRA.90 In addition, New York
Telephone makes it clear that the Garmon exceptions apply to cases involving
permitted activities. 9'
D. Trend of the Preemption Doctrine
The Court has moved from the application of a broad preemption rule formulated
in Garnon to a more narrow and restrictive rule modified by Sears and by cases
purporting to fit state laws into the Garmon exceptions. Preemption can be viewed on
a continuum with the pre-Garmon decisions and case-by-case adjudications at one
extreme and the Garmon primary jurisdiction and broad interpretation of the sub-
stantive rights rationale at the other extreme. The Court is moving away from a broad
interpretation of the preemption doctrine and toward the pre-Garmon decisions
allowing greater state regulation of labor controversies. Preemption is being thrust
into a zone of uncertainty. In its desire to allow greater state regulation, the Court
must not sacrifice federal interests in the uniform application of national labor laws
and the reduction of labor strife through the process of collective negotiation and the
necessary use of economic weapons by feuding parties. The social benefits derived
from the observation of these interests are greater than the benefits received from
short-run victories to state court plaintiffs. These interests were deemed vital by the
Congress that enacted the NLRA.
I1. HIRING PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS FOR STRIKING EMPLOYEES
Congress intentionally made available to employers the ability to hire workers to
replace employees engaged in an economic strike. 92 An employer's right to hire
permanent replacements for workers who have elected to strike for economic reasons
counterbalances the employees' economic power in the right to strike. 93 The eco-
nomic strikers retain their employee status, as defined in section 2 of the NLRA,
unless the employee has obtained regular and substantially equivalent employment. 94
pleaded and proved to support a state action sufficient to survive the preemption test.); cf. Old Dominion Branch No. 496,
Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (The Court applied the Linn standards but found the action
preempted since there was no evidence of malice.).
90. Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977); cf. Viestenz v. Fleming Cos., 681 F.2d
699, 704 (10th Cir. 1982), in which the Court cited Farmer with approval but held the action preempted, finding that the
conduct was not outrageous enough to warrant state regulation, and that preemption was proper since the claim arose out
of the discharge itself; see also Magnuson v. Burlington N., Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
930 (1978) (In holding state action for conspiracy preempted, the Court recognized that "[a]rtful pleading cannot conceal
the reality that the gravamen of the complaint is wrongful discharge.").
91. 440 U.S. 519, 540 (1979).
92. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); accord NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S.
375, 379 (1967); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local Union
No. 576 v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979); Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, Oil, Chem., and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,
436 U.S. 956 (1978).
93. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
94. National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982), defines employees as:
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The employer's power and counter-pressure results because the employer is not
obligated to reinstate the economic strikers upon their unconditional offer to return to
work if the employer can show "legitimate and substantial business justifications"95
for refusing reinstatement. When workers hired as permanent replacements during the
strike occupy jobs claimed by the economic strikers, the employer has a sufficient
business justification to refuse reinstatement. In these circumstances, reinstatement
refusal is not an unfair labor practice. 96
If, however, employees strike to protest an unfair labor practice committed by
the employer, the strike is deemed to be an unfair labor practice strike. 97 An economic
strike can be converted into an unfair labor practice strike if the employer commits
an unfair labor practice after the commencement of the strike. 98 Employees engaged
in an unfair labor practice strike do not lose their status as employees and, in contrast
to economic strikers, are entitled to reinstatement with back pay if they offer to return
to work, even if permanent replacements for them have been hired. 99
IV. HOLDING AND ANALYSIS OF BELKNAP, INC. V. HALE
A. Facts of Belknap
The facts in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale'° are typical of many cases in which
employees strike to place economic pressure on their employers after a bargaining
impasse has been reached. In Belknap, the company-union collective bargaining
agreement expired on January 31, 1978. The parties opened negotiations before the
contract term ended and bargained to an impasse. On February 1, 1978, 400 of
Belknap's employees went on strike.' 0'
Belknap granted a unilateral wage increase 02 to its nonstriking employees on the
same day the strike commenced.t 0 3 Belknap then sought to hire replacements for the
striking employees and placed ads for "permanent employees" in a local newspaper.
Each replacement worker signed a statement of understanding that he or she was hired
any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless [the Act] explicitly
states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection
with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment....
95. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967); see infra note 157 for a discussion of business justification.
96. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967).
97. R. GORIAN, supra note 4, at 339; 2 C. MoRRIS, supra note 1, at 1007.
98. For an explanation and discussion of the conversion doctrine, see generally Stewart, Conversion of Strikes:
Economic to Unfair Labor Practice: 1I, 49 VA. L. REv. 1297 (1963); Stewart, Conversion of Strikes: Economic to Unfair
Labor Practice, 45 VA. L. REv. 1322 (1959).
99. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956).
100. 463 U.S. (1983).
101. Id. at 3174.
102. A unilateral wage increase occurs when an employer uniformly raises the wages of all employees. It is arguably
an unfair labor practice to grant a unilateral wage increase in the course of an economic strike. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736 (1962) (Notice to strikers may be an issue. A unilateral wage increase without notice to the bargaining representative
is a per se violation of § 8(a)(5).). But see Kohler Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1960), in which a unilateral wage increase.
offered to the union but in a different form, was held to violate the Act.
103. Belknap, Inc., v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 494 (1983).
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as a regular full-time permanent employee. '04 Belknap also circulated memorandums
to the replacements, assuring them of their permanent status. The memos declared
that the employer did not intend to fire the replacements in order to provide jobs for
the strikers if the strikers offered to return to work. 1
0 5
Throughout this period, the striking union filed unfair labor practice charges with
the NLRB, claiming that the unilateral wage increase granted by Belknap on the date
the strike began was an unfair labor practice in violation of sections 8(a)(1), (3), and
(5) of the NLRA.106 Belknap filed countercharges against the union with the NLRB,
alleging union misconduct during the strike. At a settlement conference held before
the NLRB hearing on the unfair labor practice charges, the regional director repre-
senting the NLRB agreed to withdraw all charges and complaints if Belknap and the
striking union could reach an agreement. Belknap and the striking employees reached
an agreement which included a provision for the reinstatement of at least thirty-five
strikers per week. ' 0 7
Belknap laid off its permanent replacements to provide positions for the return-
ing strikers. The unemployed replacement workers filed actions in Kentucky state
court, alleging breach of contract and misrepresentation by Belknap. The trial court
granted Belknap's summary judgment motion and held that the NLRA preempted the
state court actions.' 0 8 The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court
decision. The intermediate court held that the contract and misrepresentation claims
were only peripheral concerns of the NLRA and were deeply rooted in local feeling
and responsibility; therefore, the court reasoned that under the Garmon exceptions the
state actions were not preempted. 109 The Kentucky Supreme Court granted discre-
tionary review, but vacated its order as having been improvidently granted. 110 The
case came before the United States Supreme Court on petition for writ of certiorari. " ' I
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Kentucky Court of Appeals
decision and found that the replacements who were promised permanent employment
could maintain state actions against Belknap for breach of contract and misrepresen-
tation. Although the Court recognized the existence of both the primary jurisdiction
104. Id. at 495.
105. Id.
106. National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(1), (3), and (5), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3), and (5) (1982) provide:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 [section 7] of
this [Act] . . .
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization . . .
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.
107. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491,496 (1983). The union-employer strike settlement agreement is set forth
in the Brief for Petitioner at 9, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
108. Hale v. Belknap, Inc., No. 78C10337 (Jefferson Cy. Cir. Court, May 8, 1980) (order granting summary
judgment). The trial court decision was unreported; see Joint Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9a, Belknap,
Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983). for a copy of the order granting summary judgment.
109. Hale v. Belknap, Inc., No. 80-CA-1630-MR (Ky. Ct. App.)(reversing order for summary judgment); see Joint
Appendix to Petition for writ of Certiorari at 14a-18a, Belknap, Inc. v. 463 U.S. 491 (1983), for a copy of the
intermediate court's order.
110. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 622 S.W.2d 918 (Ky. 1981) (discretionary review granted).
111. Cert. granted, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 457 U.S. 1131 (1982).
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rationale and the substantive rights rationale in preemption cases, it held that the state
court actions brought by the replacement workers in Belknap were not subject to
preemption under either rationale. 1 12
B. Analysis Under the Substantive Rights Rationale
The AFL-CIO and the NLRB, both as amicus curiae, and Belknap argued that
if the replacement workers were permitted to bring breach of contract and misrep-
resentation actions in state court, the employer's economic weapon of hiring perma-
nent replacements for striking employees would be destroyed. 1 3 Undermining the
self-help weapon that Congress intended to grant to employers would upset the
balance of economic power between employers and employees that Congress accom-
plished in the NLRA. Therefore, they argued, preemption would be justified. Justice
White wrote the Belknap majority opinion and reasoned that Congress might have
intended to allow a union and an employer to use their economic weapons against one
another, but that federal law could not have intended the use of economic weapons
to injure innocent third parties (the replacement workers). The Court majority held
that when an employer hires replacements for striking employees, the employer must
remain liable under state law to replacements promised permanent employment for
breach of contract and misrepresentation. 114
The majority supported its holding by arguing that the state actions would not
interfere with the federal labor law policy that encourages the peaceful settlement of
labor disputes. The majority suggested that employers could make conditional offers
of permanent employment to replacement workers. The conditional offers would
promise the replacements permanent employment, unless the employer were required
to reinstate the striking employees because of a settlement between the employer and
the striking union or a finding by the NLRB that the employer had committed an
unfair labor practice." 15 The Belknap majority asserted that such a conditional offer
of permanent employment would be sufficient to establish that economic strikers need
not be reinstated upon their unconditional offer to return to work; thus, the employer's
weapon of hiring permanent replacements would be preserved. In addition, a
conditional offer would not impede settlement; if the union and employer decided to
settle their controversy and agree to striker reinstatement, the employer would not be
liable to the replacements who were given conditional offers of permanent employ-
ment. 116
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's conditional
offer suggestion. In his view, a conditional offer of permanent employment does not
establish that the replacements have been hired for a legitimate and substantial
112. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 496-97 (1983).
113. See Brief for Petitioner at 19, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983); Brief for NLRB as amicus curiae
at 4, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983); but see Brief for AFL-CIO as amicus curiae at 4-5, Belknap. Inc. v.
Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
114. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 502 (1983).
115. Id. at 503.
116. Id. at 505. In fact, White urged that an employer was likely to settle and agree to reinstate strikers once freed
from the threat of liability by making conditional offers. d. at 505 n.9.
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business justification."t 7 Blackmun believed that the employer's right to hire replace-
ments for striking employees stems from its need to continue business operations
during a strike. 1 8 By conditioning a permanent offer of employment, an employer
admits that the purpose of hiring the replacements is not to maintain business
operations but rather to gain ammunition for bargaining with the union. In
Blackmun's view, because the employer does not have legitimate and substantial
business reasons for hiring conditional status replacements, the employer must
reinstate economic strikers upon their unconditional offer to return to work." 9
Blackmun concurred with the majority, however, because he believed that since
Congress intended employers to possess the power to hire replacement workers, state
law must obligate-the employers to the replacement workers so they can establish
legitimate business reasons for hiring the replacements. 2 0
Blackmun acquiesced in the Court's opinion that the state action would not
frustrate the federal labor law policy favoring settlement of labor disputes, since the
employer's decision to offer replacements permanent employment is a voluntary one.
If the employer does not make a permanent offer, the employer will not be subject to
liability under state law, and will then be willing to settle with the union.' 2'
Justice Brennan, dissenting from the Court's opinion in Belknap and joined by
Justices Marshall and Powell, argued that the union strike is one of the most powerful
weapons available to pressure an employer into granting concessions. The count-
erweapon available to an employer faced with a strike is the ability to hire permanent
replacements for the strikers. This threatens striking employees with the possibility
that their jobs will be forfeited. Brennan saw a potential conflict between state law and
federal law if the breach of contract and misrepresentation actions were not pre-
empted. Brennan reasoned that if the strike were adjudicated an unfair labor practice
strike, the employer would be required by federal law to reinstate the strikers, even
though permanent replacements had been hired to fill the strikers' jobs. 122 Since in
many cases it is unclear whether a strike is an unfair labor practice strike or an
economic strike, reinstatement of strikers is arguably required by federal law;
therefore, since the conduct is arguably required by federal law, breach of contract
actions brought by replacements hired to fill strikers' positions must be preempted. 23
Brennan emphasized that the Court could not proceed to adjudicate on an ad hoc basis
cases involving the preemption of breach of contract actions brought by discharged
replacements. He believed that the Court should deal with classes of cases in
preemption decisions. ' 2 4
Brennan also argued that an employer faced with potential liability to permanent
replacements likely would be unwilling to agree to a settlement with the striking
117. Id. at 514 (Blackmun. J.. concurring).
118. Id. at 518; see infra note 157.
119. 463 U.S. 491, 519 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 519.
121. Id. at 519.
122. Id. at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 530-31.
124. Id. at 530 n.2.
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union. The employer would be encouraged to litigate the unfair labor practice rather
than attempt to negotiate a settlement agreement with the union. The effect of
impeding settlement frustrates the policy of the NLRA and interferes with the NLRB's
administration of the Act. 2 5 Discouraging settlement and encouraging litigation of
unfair labor practice complaints impedes the NLRB's administration of the NLRA.
Therefore, Brannan felt that the breach of contract and misrepresentation actions
should be preempted.
The Belknap majority, however, apparently decided at the outset that the
replacement workers' breach of contract and misrepresentation actions should be
allowed to proceed, and then tried to contort the state suits into an exception to the
preemption doctrine. It seems facially unfair to bar lawsuits by replacement workers
who were promised permanent employment and were later discharged because the
employer and the striking union reached a settlement agreement. The Court appears
to have considered this in referring to the replacements as "innocent third parties." 26
The Court was concerned with the rights of the replacements who were promised
permanent employment but then were later discharged.
However, in Hot Shoppes, Inc. ' 27 the NLRB recognized the illusory nature of the
"permanence" promised to replacement workers. The Board reasoned that the
intentions of the employer and the employees are to be found in the extrinsic
circumstances surrounding the establishment of the employment relationship with
replacements and in the nature of the relationship itself.128 A replacement who crosses
a picket line must realize the circumstances surrounding his or her employment. Judge
Learned Hand recognized that
[iut is of course true that the consequences are harsh to those who have taken the strikers'
places; strikes are always harsh; ... as between those who have used a lawful weapon
and those whose protection will limit its use, the second must yield; and indeed, it is
probably true today that most men taking jobs so made vacant, realize from the outset how
tenuous is their hold.' 29
Thus, workers hired to replace strikers realize that they face the possibility of
discharge if the strikers return to their original positions. In Belknap, the company
informed the replacements that they were being hired to replace the economic strikers,
and the replacements must have crossed picket lines to enter their work place each
day. While knowledge by replacement workers of the surrounding labor dispute does
not privilege an employer to make empty promises to the replacements, it does
undercut the Belknap Court's concern for replacement workers as innocent third
parties. This knowledge also supports an inference that the replacements implicitly
agreed, in accepting employment, that Belknap retain the right to discharge the
replacements if a settlement with the union required Belknap to reinstate the strikers.
125. Id. at 3194. Of complaints issued by the NLRB, 82% are resolved by settlement agreements. Brief for NLRB
as amicus curiae at 13, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
126. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
127. 146 N.L.R.B. 802 (1964).
128. Id. at 832.
129. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 871 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
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Even though Belknap expressly told the replacements that they were being hired
permanently, the meaning of "permanence" is inherently ambiguous, since most
employment relationships are terminable at will. 130
Employers have been given the right to hire permanent replacements for
economic strikers to carry on their businesses, and an employer is not under any duty
to reinstate the economic strikers in the event that they unconditionally offer to return
to work, assuming the employer can demonstrate that it has hired permanent
replacements to fill the jobs of the striking employees. 13' The employer has the
burden of proving that the replacements were hired on a permanent basis. 132 If a court
finds that replacements were not hired permanently, the employer's duty to reinstate
economic strikers is not abrogated. Thus, the employer must be able to prove that it
hired replacements on a permanent basis if it is to have an effective economic weapon
against its striking employees.' 33
Belknap puts the employer in a "Catch-22" situation. The employer, exposed
to liability to employees hired as permanent replacements for striking employees, is
faced with two alternatives in the initial hiring of replacements. It may decide to hire
replacements on a temporary basis, or it may decide to hire replacements on a
permanent basis. If the employer hires temporary replacements, the employer loses
possession of a powerful weapon to combat the strike and force settlement with the
union. The striking employees are not faced with the possibility of forfeiting their
jobs, since they must be reinstated by the employer upon their offer to return to work.
If the employer hires permanent replacements, however, the Court in Belknap leaves
the employer subject to state court misrepresentation and breach of contract lawsuits
if the employer decides to discharge replacements and reinstate the strikers. Many
strike settlement agreements provide for reinstatement of striking employees-it is
one vital demand of the striking union in exchange for which the union grants
concessions on other issues. 134 After Belknap, the employer has little, if any,
motivation to offer the striking employees jobs when it has hired permanent replace-
ments. If the strike is arguably an unfair labor practice strike, the employer is
encouraged to litigate and defend the complaint rather than settle it. Settlement with
potential liability to replacements is less desirable than defending the complaint and
hoping that the strike will be adjudicated an economic strike. If the strike is
adjudicated an economic strike, the employer would not be required to reinstate the
strikers. If it is found to be an unfair labor practice strike, the employer must reinstate
130. The liability to the replacements may be questioned since in many cases, employment is terminable at the will
of either the employee or the employer. This Comment shall not review the changes and aberrations in the employment
at will doctrine. For an expose of current trends in the doctrine see Krisher, The Growing Arsenal of Rights of
Unrepresented Enployees: Recent Trends in the Comnmon-LavEnploynentAt-Vili Doctrine and Employee Privacy, 1982
LW8. L. DEVaOP.MENrs 245.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 92-99.
132. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967); accord NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equip. Co., 626
F.2d 567, 572 (7th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Murray Prods., Inc., 584 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1978).
133. Brennan recognized that the need to establish the permanence of the replacements was probably the reason that
the company in Belknap assured replacements that they were permanent. Belknap. Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 537 n. 11
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. See. e.g., Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720. 728 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964);
Note, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630 (1966).
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strikers, but the employer's liability to replacements is unclear. The effect of Belknap
will be to discourage the settlement of labor disputes and to encourage litigation,
thereby adversely affecting the administration of the NLRB.
The Belknap Court, in an effort to accommodate the interests of the replacement
workers, ignored this adverse impact on labor policy. The Court attempted to remedy
this problem by providing for a conditional permanent offer to replacement workers.
The dissenters and Justice Blackmun, although for different reasons, properly rec-
ognized that a conditonal offer of permanent employment provides a deficient answer.
The dissenting Justices worried that conditional offers would decrease the employer's
ability to find replacement workers. 135 However, if replacements have always known
"how tenuous their hold" is on their employment, 36 an employer who expressly
informs the replacements that their status is conditional should not find its ability to
find replacement workers diminished. The real problem is that employers will find
permanent replacements for the strikers and refuse to reinstate the striking employ-
ees. 137
It is also uncertain whether the Board will be willing to find that replacements
offered employment conditionally are "permanent" replacements, so as to abrogate
an employer's duty to reinstate economic strikers should they offer to return to
work. 138 Without the ability to threaten the striking employees with no reinstatement,
the employer's economic weapon of hiring permanent replacements is destroyed and
employers are without any bargaining leverage in settlement negotiations with the
striking union. It is not within the province of the Court to interfere with economic
weapons which Congress intended to be free from governmental regulation. 139
Justice Blackmun believes that conditional offers render the replacements
nonpermanent. An employer that threatens during strike settlement negotiations to
retain replacements hired conditionally violates the NLRA and commits an unfair
labor practice, since an unjust refusal to reinstate strikers at the end of an economic
strike may discourage the right to strike.' 40 Therefore, a prudent employer would not
assume the risk of hiring replacements on a conditional basis.
Under pre-Belknap law, before employers could refuse to reinstate economic
strikers they were required to show that they had hired permanent replacements.
Neither the NLRB nor any court had ever held that an employer is bound to retain
permanent replacements because they had been offered permanent employment. This
might make the meaning of an offer of "permanent" employment in the labor setting
135. 463 U.S. 491, 538 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. See supra text accompanying note 129.
137. See Lopatka, Recent High Court Case Clarifies Rights of Permanent Replacements, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 8, 1983,
at 19, col. 1; Rissetto & Dufek, Terminated Strike Replacements Permitted to Site, Legal Times, Aug. 8, 1983, at 23.
col. 1.
138. The NLRB often disagrees with the federal courts. The Supreme Court in Belknap only suggested the offering
of conditionally permanent employment to replacements, and it is uncertain whether the Board would find the conditional
offers sufficient to establish that the replacements were permanent. This is particularly true in light of the NLRB's position
as amicus curiae in Belknap.
139. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Local
20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
140. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 516 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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different from its meaning in the ordinary context,' 4' but this difference is necessary
because any obligation to the replacements utterly destroys the weapon that employers
have been given by Congress under the NLRA. In Mooremack Gulf Lines, Inc. 142 the
NLRB specifically noted that the employer was not bound to discharge the replace-
ments it had promised permanent employment, but it could choose to retain the
replacements. 143 The Office of the General Counsel for the NLRB has asserted that
if state actions for breach of contract and misrepresentation brought by discharged
permanent replacements were allowed, the employer's license to offer employment to
replacements would be defeated. Permanent replacements, according to the General
Counsel, bear the risk of being laid off or discharged.144 The General Counsel's view
merits deference, since Congress created the Board as a special administrative agency
specifically designed to deal with labor disputes based on its expertise in the special
interests involved in the industrial labor field.' 45
C. Analysis Under the Primary Jurisdiction Rationale
Belknap also contended that because Belknap's grant of a unilateral wage
increase on the day the strike began was arguably prohibited by section 8 of the
NLRA,' 46 preemption of the state court actions was required under the primary
jurisdiction rationale. 147 The Court rejected this argument and reaffirmed the Sears
critical inquiry test used in arguably prohibited cases.' 48 In applying this test, the
Belknap Court found that the controversy presented to the state court was not identical
to the controversy which could have been presented to the NLRB. Therefore,
preemption was not required. The Court also noted that the state had a substantial
interest in permitting the state actions of the replacement workers, while the actions
were of only peripheral concern to the NLRA. 149 Thus, even if preemption were
proper, the case fell within an exception to the rule. The Court unanimously agreed
that the arguably prohibited branch of the primary jurisdiction rationale did not
warrant preemption in Belknap. Justice Brennan appears to have accepted the
"critical inquiry" test that he had rejected in Sears. ' 50
The Court, however, failed to view the dispute in its entirety. Instead, it
bifurcated the controversy into two disjoint sets: (1) the controversy between the
strikers and Belknap, and (2) the relationship between the employer and the replace-
ment workers. In a preemption case, the conduct being regulated is the proper focal
141. Id. at 541-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. 28 N.L.R.B. 869 (1941).
143. Id. at 881.
144. Higgins, Overview of the Office of General Counsel, 1983 LAB. L. DsvLopssms 151, 163-64.
145. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec., Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274.
288-91 (1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
146. Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
147. See. e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
148. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491,510 (1983); see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council
of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
149. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 511 (1983).
150. Id. at 534 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to Brennan, "careful analysis" yields that while the conduct
was arguably prohibited, the state action cannot be preempted under this theory. He refrained, however, from explaining
his analysis.
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point.' 5 1 In Belknap the regulated conduct was the discharge, for the purpose of
reinstating economic strikers, of replacements promised permanent employment.
Thus, the three parties are interrelated and cannot be treated distinctly. Even under the
Sears critical inquiry approach, the controversy before the NLRB would have been
whether the replacements were wrongly discharged, and this is the exact controversy
which faced the Kentucky state courts.
The Belknap Court expressed concern that the replacements would be denied a
remedy unless they had access to the state courts, since in the Court's view the
replacements could not bring their complaint before the NLRB.152 Preemption,
however, often deprives someone of a right he or she would otherwise have the power
to assert. This sacrifice is necessary to advance a greater social interest. The uniform
application of federal labor laws and the encouragement of peaceful settlement of
labor disputes are vital to the national administration of labor-management relations.
While it might seem undesirable to prefer a public interest over conflicting private
rights, it is often necessary and is implicit in the nature of preemption.
V. PROBLEMS RAISED BY BELKNAP AND A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
Two major issues require consideration as a result of the Court's decision in
Belknap, Inc. v. Hale. First, the rights of replacements and the effect of these rights
on the balance of economic weapons available to strikers and employers must be
determined. Second, a workable rule of preemption must be developed.
A. The Effect of Belknap on the Rights of Employers, Strikers, and Replacements
1. The Employer's Decision to Hire Replacement Workers
After Belknap, to insulate the company from liability to replacement workers,
employers must reconsider their positions before hiring replacements to carry on
business operations in the midst of a strike. An employer is bound to reinstate
economic strikers if they unconditionally offer to return to work, but the duty to
reinstate is abrogated if the employer can prove it hired permanent replacements. 53
Belknap holds that an employer may be liable to the permanent replacements for state
court damage actions if the employer chooses to discharge the replacements and
reinstate the strikers. 154
151. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec., Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274. 292 (1971).
152. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 510 (1983).
153. It is often disputed whether an employer has, in fact. hired "permanent" replacements. See Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists, District No. 8 v. J.L, Clark Co., 471 F.2d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 1972), in which the Court held that employers
cannot abuse the right to hire permanent replacements by using pretextual permanent replacements; accord Lodge 743 and
1746, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 433, 449 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825
(1976).
154. See Illinois v. Federal Tool and Plastics, 62111. 2d 549, 344 N.E.2d 1 (1975), in which the Supreme Court of
Illinois preempted an Illinois state statute that imposed criminal sanctions on employers who failed to give notice of strikes
in progress when advertising for replacement workers. The court reasoned that the law encumbered the employer's right
to hire permanent replacements and impaired the balance struck by Congress in the NLRA.
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The Belknap Court suggests that an employer condition permanent offers of
employment to the replacements, and asserts that this would insulate the employer
from liability to the replacements and still provide the employer with an effective
weapon to be used against striking employees during settlement negotiations. 155 Four
Justices disagreed with the Court's assertion that conditional offers satisfy the
permanence requirement necessary for the employer to refuse reinstatement of
economic strikers at their demand. In fact, the amount and nature of the conditions
associated with the conditional offer that will convince a court that the permanence
requirement is satisfied remains uncertain.
Because the effect of a conditional offer is uncertain employers likely will be
unwilling to make such offers, since if replacements offered conditional employment
are found not to be permanent employees, the employer then has no bargaining
leverage in union negotiations. If the strikers demand their jobs back, the employer
will be bound to reinstate the strikers upon their unconditional offer to return to
work. 156 An employer who is unable to threaten strikers with foreclosure from their
jobs will be unarmed during negotiations with the striking union. ' 57 In Belknap Justice
Blackmun even argued that an employer who hired conditionally permanent replace-
ments would commit an unfair labor practice if, during the strike, the employer
threatened the strikers that they would not be reinstated.15 8
An employer could choose to hire replacements who are clearly temporary, but
this strips the employer of bargaining leverage since hiring temporary replacements
is not sufficient to abrogate an employer's duty to reinstate economic strikers if they
unconditionally offer to return to work. 159 Of course, the employer could choose not
to hire replacement workers at all, but the employer would remain powerless during
negotiations with the union and, additionally, would be unable to carry on its
operations.
155. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 503-04, 503 n.8 (1983).
156. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equip. Co., 626 F.2d 567, 572 (7th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Murray Prods..
Inc.. 584 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1978).
157. Some commentators argue that the only justification for allowing an employer to hire permanent replacements
is to permit it to carry on its business during a strike, and that the permanent offer is necessary to induce workers to enter
the employment relationship. This view ignores that hiring permanent replacements is an employer's weapon to force
union concessions during negotiations. Without the threat of possibly losing their jobs, employees could strike and return
to work at their whims, and employers could not combat this practice. It would be a one-sided battle and the union could
continue assaulting the employer, thereby testing its economic strength. If the employer could withstand this attack, the
employees would lose nothing; they are entitled to return to work. Thus, the hiring of permanent replacements is also a
necessary employer weapon to balance the economic forces between unions and employers. See Schatzki, Some
Observations atd Suggestions Cotcerning a Misnomer-"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 Tsx. L. REv. 378, 382
(1969); Comment, The Illusion of Permanency for Mackay Doctrine Replacement Workers, 54 TEx. L. REV. 126 (1975);
Comment, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity. 50 Tsx. L. REv. 782 (1972); Comment,
Replacement Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630 (1966). These articles suggest that temporary employees should
be used during all strikes. This view is consistent with the justification that replacements are hired solely to carry on the
employer's business during a strike, and does not interfere with the employee's right to strike. Contra Getman, The
Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195 (1967) (The
author recognizes that although the purpose of replacements is to allow employers to carry on their businesses, the
replacements may also serve other employer interests, e.g., the replacements may not be union adherents. While this may
impose risk on strike activity, the current rule is as good as any other since there is no way to read the minds of
employers.).
158. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 516 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
159. NLRB v. Murray Prods., Inc., 584 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1978).
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The Belknap Court did not deny that employers may hire permanent replace-
ments for striking employees, 60 but held that the replacements promised permanent
employment may sue for breach of contract and misrepresentation in state court if they
are discharged to make room for returning strikers. Since any offer to replacements,
other than a permanent offer, may effectively strip an employer of bargaining
leverage, any employer insistent upon its bargaining demands' 6' will hire permanent
replacements. After Belknap, an employer has little incentive to agree to the
reinstatement of striking employees. It will hire permanent replacements for eco-
nomic strikers in order to increase its bargaining strength. The employer must
continue to bargain with the striking union if negotiations are reestablished, but the
employer is not obligated to agree to any substantive term, including the reinstatement
of the strikers. It is unlikely that an employer will ever be willing to reinstate strikers,
except as jobs become available, since if an employer discharges the permanent
replacements it may be liable to them for damages. Because union employees fear loss
of their jobs, they will hesitate before striking. The discouragement of economic
strikes is undesirable in view of Congress' intention that employers and employees
have available to them economic warfare in the event peaceful negotiations fail. The
real danger resulting from Belknap, then, is the enhancement of employers' power. 62
The hiring of replacement workers may permit an employer to circumvent
dealing with the striking union altogether. If there is reason to believe that the union
no longer represents a majority of the employees, 63 a petition for an election to
decertify the union as the bargaining representative of the employees may be filed.164
The replacement workers have the right to vote in any election. 65 If the election is
held within twelve months after the commencement of the economic strike, the
strikers also have the right to vote. 166 If the election is held twelve months after the
commencement of the strike, however, the striking employees may not vote in the
decertification election. 167
Predicting the results of a decertification vote becomes easy. It is unlikely that
replacement workers would support the union, given the competing interests of the
union and the replacements during the strike. The union must bargain to reinstate the
160. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). In fact, Belknap has recently been cited for the proposition
that the right to hire permanent replacements is one of the employer's primary weapons during an economic strike. Vulcan
Hart Corp. v. NLRB, 718 F.2d 269, 274 (8th Cir. 1983).
161. It is likely that the employer will be insistent on its bargaining demands since the strike is called after an impasse
in negotiations has been reached, and the parties are deadlocked in disagreement. The very purpose of economic warfare
is to pressure the weaker party into departing from its bargaining demands.
162. See supra note 137.
163. Since the replacements may make up a bulk of the unit, it may be reasonable to infer that the union no longer
represents a majority. The interests of the replacements conflict with those of the union, which also represents the strikers.
and it follows that the replacements are not likely to want the union as their bargaining representative.
164. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(I)(A). 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(I)(A) (1982).
165. American Chem. Corp., 215 N.L.R.B. 94 (1974); Pacific Tile & Porcelain Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1962).
166. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1982). Strikers have the right to vote in
elections held within twelve months after the strike began, whether the strikers are actively on strike or whether they are
on a preferential reinstatement list as a result of an economic strike. Bio-Science Laboratories v. NLRB, 542 F.2d 505
(9th Cir. 1976).
167. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1982). This is true whether the election is a
certification or a decertification election. Wahl Clipper Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 634 (1972).
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strikers, but by doing so it implicitly supports ousting the replacements from their
jobs. Therefore, the union will likely be defeated in a decertification election within
the twelve month period, and defeat is almost certain if the election is held after the
twelve month period expires, since the economic strikers who have not been
reinstated by the employer lose their rights to vote. 68 The result in each situation
depends on the number of replacements hired and the number of strikers voting. The
Belknap Court appears to have overlooked this effect on unionization and collective
bargaining in its haste to provide a remedy for the discharged replacement workers.
An employer faces different problems if the strike is adjudicated an unfair labor
practice strike. In that case the employer must reinstate strikers, even if permanent
replacements have been hired.169 The Belknap majority opinion suggests that em-
ployers will also be liable, for breach of contract and misrepresentation, to replace-
ment workers promised permanent employment if the replacements are discharged to
make room for the unfair labor practice strikers.'1 0 The employer, of course, may
agree to retain the replacements and reinstate the strikers, but the employer then faces
the anomaly of maintaining a double workforce. Since it often cannot be determined
whether a strike is economic or unfair labor practice in nature, an employer faced with
the possibility of liability to replacements will be hesitant to offer permanent
employment, and the employer's economic weapon of hiring permanent replacements
is hindered.
The dissenters in Belknap were concerned with the possibility that a strike would
be adjudicated an unfair labor practice strike. '7' They suggested that an employer
should not bear the risk of whether the strike is determined to be an economic or an
unfair labor practice strike, and would not hold the employer liable to the replace-
ments promised permanent employment in either an unfair labor practice or an
economic strike case. This leaves the employer free to exercise its self-help weapon
of hiring permanent replacements.
2. Analysis of Alternative Remedies for Replacement Workers
The replacement employee's status under the NLRA remains a mystery. The
replacements are employees as defined in section 2(3) of the NLRA,17 2 and thus, are
168. In Vulcan Hart Corp. v. NLRB, 718 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1983), the employer hired 24 permanent replacements
for its striking employees. Four strikers returned to work and 33 employees remained on strike. The employer in Vulcan
Hart caused a decertification petition to be filed and withdrew recognition from the union. The court found this to be an
unfair labor practice since the employer could not show an actual lack of majority support or a reasonable good-faith doubt
of the union's majority. Even assuming the 24 replacements and the 4 returning strikers did not support the union, they
alone did not outnumber the strikers. The reasonableness of whether enough strikers were dissatisfied with the union to
swing the majority of workers into the category of dissaffection with the union was a question of fact, which the NLRB
resolved in the union's favor.
169. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964); NLRB v. Efco Mfg., Inc., 227 F.2d 675 (Ist Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
1007 (1956).
170. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 508 n.12, 512 (1983).
171. Id. at 528, 542 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. See supra note 94. The NLRA as originally proposed denied strike replacements employee status. I LEoisLA'nVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR REaATIoNs Act oF 1935 at 2 (1949). Today, the replacements are accorded the NLRA
status of employees. See also In re Mooremack Gulf Lines, Inc., 28 N.L.R.B. 869 (1941).
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guaranteed the section 7 statutory rights of self-organization; forming, joining, or
assisting labor organizations; and engaging in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining. Section 7 also guarantees the replacements the right to refrain
from all section 7 activities. 173 While the replacements may refrain from joining the
union that represents the bargaining unit into which the replacements are hired, the
replacements are considered members of the certified bargaining unit. By virtue of the
replacements' status as members of the bargaining unit, the union representing the
unit becomes the exclusive representative of the replacements, even though they are
not union members. 174 The employer is bound to bargain exclusively with the union
as the sole representative of the unit, to avoid committing an unfair labor practice. 75
The employer, however, cannot discriminate against the replacement employees
in regard to tenure of employment and cannot encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization.176 Discharged permanent replacements could therefore
argue that the employer has committed an unfair labor practice by discharging them
from their jobs for the purpose of reinstating the strikers, 77 since the discharges
resulted solely from the replacements' lack of union membership. The replacements
would have access to NLRB jurisdiction, but the outcome of this litigation is
uncertain. The employer's defense would be that the NLRA obligates the employer
to bargain exclusively with the union as the sole representative of the employees, and
the employer has done nothing more than fulfill its statutory duty.
The replacements could bring an action against the union for a breach of its duty
of fair representation.I7 The union would counter that it had a reasonable basis-
seniority-for preferring the strikers' reinstatement rights over the rights of the
replacement workers. However, a court will not allow the union to successfully
advance a pretextual justification if it actually had an improper motive behind its
preference. 179 A state court action brought by replacement workers against a union for
breach of its duty of fair representation might be preempted by federal labor policy,
since holding a union liable to permanent replacements when the union must also
negotiate with the employer and urge reinstatement of the striking employees would
destroy the employees' strike weapon; a union would be hesitant to urge reinstatement
of striking employees if it would be held liable in state court to permanent replace-
ments. Since reinstatement would be uncertain, union members would fear the
possible loss of their jobs, and the use of economic strikes would be discouraged.
173. See supr. note 23.
174. In re Louis Natt, 44 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1942).
175. See supra note 106.
176. Discrimination violates § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. See supra note 106.
177. See Comment, supra note 157, at 133-34.
178. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (breach of duty of fair representation occurs when union's conduct
toward a member of the bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953).
179. See Comment, The Illusion of Permanency for Mackay Replacement Workers, 54 TEx. L. REv. 126. 145
(1975).
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3. A Proposed Solution
The Belknap Court's decision presents many complex problems in the interre-
lationship between employers, striking employees, and replacement workers. Inher-
ent conflicts between all the parties to a labor dispute are present in the federal scheme
enacted by Congress. An employer should not be forced to gamble on whether a strike
by its employees is an unfair labor practice or an economic strike to effectively
exercise its ability to hire permanent replacements. A "good" gamble by an employer
who decides to hire permanent replacements that the strike is an economic dispute
destroys the interests of the union. After Belknap, a "bad" gamble by the employer
who decides to hire permanent replacements that the strike is economic, when it is
later determined to be an unfair labor practice strike, unduly burdens an employer's
interest. The replacements' interests are a concern, too, and it seems unfair to promise
them permanent employment and later discharge them to reinstate strikers. Past
decisions have suggested that the replacements' interests must yield to the national
interests in the promotion of collective bargaining to achieve industrial peace. 180 A
compromise, however, could be reached that would still absolve employers from
liability for state court breach of contract and misrepresentation lawsuits to replace-
ments who were promised unconditional permanent employment. If the reinstatement
of economic strikers is agreed upon, or if the strike is adjudicated to be an unfair labor
practice strike and the employer is ordered to reinstate the striking employees, the
strikers should be reinstated. The "permanent" replacements, in turn, should be
either (1) retained by the employer or (2) given the employment status that economic
strikers presently enjoy when they have been permanently replaced' 8 '-retention of
employment status with the employer, receipt of all incidental fringe benefits, and the
right to be recalled to work when opportunities become available until the replace-
ments find substantially equivalent employment. 182 This solution affords the replace-
ments some protection and maintains the balance of power created by Congress in the
NLRA.
B. Further Preemption Problems
1. Primary Jurisdiction Rationale
Belknap, Inc. v. Hale casts further shadows on the development of a clear and
predictable preemption doctrine. The Belknap Court confirmed that two distinct
theories of preemption exist: the primary jurisdiction rationale and the substantive
rights rationale. The arguably protected, the arguably prohibited, and the permitted
activity branches of the preemption doctrine, however, present problems after
Belknap.
180. See supra note 50 and text accompanying note 129.
181. See Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99, 105 (7th Cir. 1969). cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); accord H
& F Binch Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 357, 364 (2d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Johnson Sheet Metal, Inc., 442 F.2d 1056, 1061
(l0th Cir. 1971).
182. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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The life of the arguably protected branch of the primary jurisdiction rationale
remains threatened. The Court may have held that the state actions in Belknap should
not be preempted because of its opinion that since the replacements had no access to
the NLRB, preemption of the replacements' state actions would leave the workers
without a forum to determine whether the company's conduct was, in fact, actually
protected. This has been a recurring criticism of the arguably protected branch of the
preemption doctrine. The problems resulting from the Belknap decision add momen-
tum to this criticism. While the replacements would not have a forum to decide
whether the conduct was actually protected, the preemption of a few cases involving
conduct which is arguably, but in reality not actually, protected by the NLRA is the
necessary price paid for the advancement of a uniform national labor policy.
The Justices apparently unanimously adopted the critical inquiry test that was
formulated in Sears for conduct arguably prohibited by the NLRA. 183 The problem
with the critical inquiry test is that, in most cases, an action brought before a state
court may be easily distinguished from an action brought before the NLRB. 184 This
distinction is most easily made by ignoring the mandate of Garmon and Lockridge that
the focus of the inquiry be on the conduct being regulated and not on the governing
legal standards defining the conduct. 85
By loosening the arguably protected and arguably prohibited branches of the
preemption doctrine, the Court has departed from a broad application of preemption
and has granted the states greater power to regulate labor-management disputes.
Uniformity in the application of the federal labor laws has been sacrificed and will
continue to suffer since conduct is often not clearly protected nor prohibited by the
NLRA. Few activities can be catalogued actually protected or actually prohibited by
the NLRA rather than arguably protected or arguably prohibited. Fitting the conduct
into an "arguably" category provides those seeking state regulation a greater chance
to gain relief in state court.
2. Substantive Rights Rationale
The Belknap decision supports the test formulated in Machinists that whether
Congress intended conduct to be left unregulated may be determined by examining
whether the operation of state law would frustrate the policies of federal labor law.
The problem in Belknap lies with the Court's application of the rule. The Court, in
its short-sighted attempt to redress appealing grievances, did not weigh the policies
behind the NLRA heavily enough.
Perhaps the Court will soon be presented with a case in which it can remedy the
problems which permeate the preemption doctrine. The return to a broader preemp-
tion doctrine to guarantee the uniform application of federal labor laws and to advance
the federal labor policy of encouraging collective bargaining for the purpose of
183. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 510 (1983). Justice Brennan, who rejected the test in Sears, accepts the
test in his Belknap dissent. Id. at 534 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184. See Brody, supra note 15, at 218-20.
185. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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reducing industrial strife is imperative. Balancing tests for preemption cases have
been suggested, 86 but the balancing tests lack predictability in results and are open
to the subjective determinations of various judges who may view differently a given
activity's effect on labor-management interests. Balancing does suggest, however,
that the effect of state regulation on an activity is the real concern in preemption
cases, 87 and the Court must not get involved in providing short term results at the cost
of sacrificing a uniform national labor policy. The Court should adopt a presumption
that state laws which conflict with labor-management interests are preempted unless
the law can be fit into an exception.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale ignored established preemption principles by
holding that state court breach of contract and misrepresentation actions against an
employer brought by discharged replacement employees, who were promised per-
manent employment and hired to fill jobs of striking employees, are not preempted
by federal labor law. Its decision defeats the policies of the NLRA. Exposure to state
liability destroys the employer's economic weapon of hiring permanent replacements,
yet enhances an employer's economic power in certain situations. Employees will
now fear the results of an economic strike, and the use of economic strikes may be
chilled. A better solution to the plight of replacement workers would be to allow
employers to hire permanent replacements for economic strikers, and to discharge the
replacements if strike settlement or a Board or court order calls for reinstatement of
the striking employees. The interests of the discharged replacement workers should
be protected by allowing these workers to retain their employment status with the
employer, receive all incidental rights and privileges normally accorded an employee,
and be entitled to reinstatement as jobs become available.
The Belknap Court also added to the confusion surrounding the application of the
preemption doctrine. The Court needs to clarify and broaden the scope of the
preemption doctrine to encourage the uniform application of the NLRA and the use
of collective bargaining to achieve industrial peace.
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